FROM JURISTOCRACY TO MINISTROCRACY

Constitutional disfuncionality in Brazil

Abstract

This article has the power to demonstrate how the performance of the Federal Supreme Court has impacted the democratic game, through Ran Hirschl's concept of juristocracy, which, when applied in the Brazilian constitutional system, seems to go beyond the normative issue or political option transfer of powers from political elites to the judiciary. Starting from Ran Hirschl's jurisprudence, we move on to the concept of ministrocracy, which can be considered a more accentuated face of all the power of the highest juridical court given to the investiture of each minister. For the development of this study, a literature review was used with works related to the theme. It was evidenced that the “Brazilian” juristocracy is guided by judicial activism creating a sui generis Constitutional Court in democratic states of law. The Federal Supreme Court gained power at the hands of political elites, moved away from the law, and its ministers became active members of these elites, with all state power distributed among the eleven spokespersons of Brazilian juristocracy.